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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA: BLOOD AND THE CONSTITUTION

On June 13, 1966, the United States Supreme Court handed
down the controversial ruling of Miranda v. Arizona.' In that decision, the Court actually reviewed four criminal cases2 involving
basically the same Constitutional issues. Three of the petitioners,
Miranda, Vignera, and Westover, were appealing from convictions in state and federal courts for the crimes of rape, robbery,
and kidnapping. The fourth petitioner, State of California, appealed from the California Supreme Court's reversal of respondent Stewart's conviction for rape, robbery and murder Each accused had, without benefit of counsel and after varying degrees
and intensity of police interrogation, given oral or written confessions. In reversing the convictions of petitioners Miranda,
Vignera, and Westover and affirming the California Court's reversal of respondent Stewart's conviction, Chief Justice Warren
writing for a narrow majority of five laid down precise guidelines
to be followed by State and federal police officers in future interrogations.4
This decision set in motion a national wave of controversy!s
Much of the discussion praised the ruling, and much damned it
as an unwarranted interference with and virtual hamstringing of
'Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct 1602 (1966).
21d.
'People v. Stewart, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1955).
Supra, note 1, at 1612. "The prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogati6n 6f
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The Court
defined these procedural safeguards as: "Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney .... The defendant may
waive... these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."
U. PiTr. L Riv. 77 (1966); 19 VAD. L. REv. 1379 (1966);
-28
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on
the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MxcH. L REv. 59 (1966); Schaefer, Police Interrogationand the Privi.
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police investigational procedures. While the critics bemoaned the
alleged inbalance created by Miranda in favor of protection of the
rights of an accused at the expense of the health and safety of the
public, the Supreme Court, seven days after propounding Miranda,
on June 20, 1966, announced its decision in Schmerber v. California,6 which is the subject of this note. Schmerber appears to be,
in a narrow area, contrary to the trend of Miranda and earlier
cases7 which enlarged the rights of a criminally accused protected
by the United States Constitution.
In Schmerber, the Court, in another five to four decision, held
that State compulsion of one suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol to submit to a blood test, and admission of the
results of analysis of such test in the trial of the accused for the
crime of driving while intoxicated was not a denial of due process
and was not an abridgment of the accused's right to counsel, his
privilege against self-incrimination, or his privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution." The petitioner, Armando Schmerber, was involved in an automobile collision in 1964 on a California highway. He sustained minor injuries and was taken to a hospital for
treatment. There a California patrolman observed petitioner and
became suspicious as to his state of sobriety. Petitioner was thereupon arrested and at the patrolman's direction, over the express
objection and refusal by petitioner and his attorney who was
present, a sample of blood was taken from petitioner by a physician. An analysis of the blood sample, showing a percent of alcohol by weight which indicated intoxication, was introduced into
evidence, over objection, at petitioner's trial in Los Angeles Municipal Court, which resulted in a conviction. The Appellate Delege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U. L REv. 506 (1966); LIFE,
Oct. 21, 1966, p. 35; SATURDAY EVEmNIG PosT, July 30, 1966, p. 82;
TIME, June 24, 1966, p. 53; NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1966, p. 21; U. S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 1, 1966, p. 46, 51; U. S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 17, 1966, p. 82.
6Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1966).
7 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377U.S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Rog~s
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.

355 (1959); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
'U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV.
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partment of the California Superior Court upheld the conviction
and upon denial of certification by the California District Court
of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.!
The Majority opinion written by Justice Brennan on behalf of
himself and Justices Clark and White (Justices Harlan and
Stewart concurring by separate opinion based primarily on the
White, Harlan, and Stewart dissenting opinions in Mirandd')
deals with each constitutional claim separately. The right to counsel claim was dismissed with little comment," the principal contentions of petitioner being based on his allegations of denial of
due process, and infringement on his privileges against selfincrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures. But before
the Court's reasoning can be intelligently discussed, it is essential
that a background be laid in the form of a brief review of two
prior decisions which are fundamental to and cited throughout
Schmerber.
The first such case is Breithaupt v. Abram' 2 decided in 1957
in an opinion by Justice Clark writing for a majority of six. There
petitioner Breithaupt had been convicted in a New Mexico State
court for the crime of involuntary manslaughter arising out of an
automobile collision. As in Schmerber, blood had been extracted
from Breithaupt by a doctor at a hospital at a police officer's
direction, and the results of an analysis of the blood were admitted
as evidence in Breithaupt's trial. But unlike Schmerber, petitioner
Breithaupt was unconscious when the blood was extracted and
was, therefore, unable to object at that time. Breithaupt did not
appeal his conviction but later sought a writ of habeas corpus
alleging denial of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The New Mexico Supreme
Court denied the writ ' and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari."
'Schmerber v. California, 382 U.S. 971 (1966).
I'Spra, note 1, at 740, 753; dissenting opinions not discussed here as
reasoning not particularly in point.
"Supra, note 6 at 1833.
'2 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
13Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 NM. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954).
"Breithaupt v. Abram, 351 U.S. 906 (1956).
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The Supreme Court did not pass on the merits of Breithaupt's
constitutional allegations, holding that the United States Constitution did not require, in state prosecution of a state crime, the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the accused's Fourth
Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."
The exclusionary rule had, of course, been applicable for many
years in federal court proceedings.' The Court dismissed petitioner
Breithaupt's principal contention that the conduct of the state
patrolman offended that "sense of justice" of which the Court
spoke in Rochin v.California," the second background case to be
considered in connection with Schmerber.
In Rochin, three deputy sheriffs on a narcotics raid, without
a search warrant, entered the home of the accused and upon observing Rochin placing some capsules into his mouth, tried to
retrieve same by holding him down, forcing open his mouth, and
forcibly attempting to extract the pills therefrom. This being unsuccessful, petitioner Rochin was taken to a hospital where he
was forced to submit to having his stomach pumped. The capsules
were recovered and analyzed. The results of the analysis, indicating the presence of narcotics, was admitted as evidence at Rochin's
trial for the crime of possessing a preparation of morphine. The
California District Court of Appeal upheld the conviction" and
hearing was denied by the Supreme Court of California." The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari2 ' and in
deciding the case, in 1952, reversed petitioner Rochin's conviction,
again not on constitutional grounds, but as Justice Frankfurter
for a unanimous Court put it, because "... .this course of proceeding by the agents of the government to obtain evidence is bound
to offend even the hardened sensibilities... it shocks the con"SWoff v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
"Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
11
"People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1950).
"People v. Rochin, 225 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1951).
21Rochin v. California, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
"Supra, note 15; Twining v. New Jersey, supra, note 16.
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science .... They are methods too close to the rack and the screw
to permit of Constitutional differentiation . . .,23 being conduct
which offends "... . a sense of justice...", running counter to the
". decencies of civilized conduct .... "
In deciding Breithaupt,the Court refused to apply the Rochin
rule by finding that the official action under review in Breithaupt
was not "brutal and offensive" to due process in the sense of
Rochin. In support of this finding, the Court pointed to the fact
that every medical precaution was taken with respect to Breithaupt
and took judicial notice of the fact that blood tests are extensively,
safely and commonly taken for a variety of purposes. The Court
further bolstered its holding by stating, ... the individuals right
to immunity from such invasion of the body as is involved in a
properly safeguarded blood test, is far outweighed by the value
of the deterrant effect due to public realization that the issue of
driving while under the influence of alcohol can often by this
method be taken out of the confusion of conflicting contentions."' Moreover, Justice Clark noted that many states, either by
statute or court approval, authorize the use of chemical tests for
intoxication.'
"
Sfpra, note 18 at 172.
24
Sfpra, note 18 at 173.
2'Sapra, note 12 at 439.
26
1Sapra, note 12 at 451; see also Uses of Chemical Tests for Intoxication,
Committee on Tests for Intoxication of the National Safety Council
(1955). At this writing the Oklahoma Legislature is considering such a
statute. Senate Bill No. 28 has passed the Senate and its counterpart,
House Bill No. 564, has passed the House of Representatives. Conference
Committee consideration appears necessary. Both bills, in my opinion,
are rather ineffectual having been substantially weakened by amendment.
The Senate version provides that drivers in Oklahoma, by virtue of

their act of driving, give their consent to a blood or breath test, to be

administered by a qualified physician, technician, etc. at the direction
of a police officer who has "reasonable grounds" to believe that the
driver is under the influence of alcohol (Sections 1 and 2). The results
of such a test are admissible in criminal proceedings arising out of acts
committed by the accused while allegedly under the influence (Section
6); the results not being admissible in civil actions (Section 2). The
bill is completely disemboweled by Section 3 which provides that a
conscious person may refuse to submit to a chemical test, and for such
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It was with these cases, Rochin and Breithaupt, as discussed
above, that the Court was faced in its consideration of Schmerber.
Justice Brennan first took up petitioner's due process claim which
was summarily rejected by finding nothing to distinguish Schmerber from Breithaupt.
The Court next examined petitioner's self-incrimination claim.
As noted previously, in Breithaupt the Court had not considered
this Constitutional issue. But in view of its post-Breithaupt decision of Malloy v. HoganF the Court was forced to deal with it

in Schmerber. Thus the Court had to decide whether or not the
facts behind Schmerber constituted a violation of this Constiturefusal his drivers license my be suspended for six months (subject to

limited review by the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety and

eventually the Court of Common Pleas as provided in Sections 4 and
5). Under the Breithaupt and Schnerber decisions discussed in this note,
there is no constitutional basis for this fatal limitation. The Senate bill
goes on to define intoxication in terms of per cent of alcohol per weight
of blood (Section6) and to declare an emergency so that it will be
effective as soon as passed.
The House version is substantially the same as the Senate Bill. However, it is much stronger in that it provides for saliva and urine tests in
addition to breath and blood tests (Section 1), and that evidence of refusal to submit to a test is admissible in criminal and civil proceedings
arising out of acts committed while allegedly under the influence (Section 8). Also the results of such tests are admissible in civil and criminal
proceedings (Section 7). The House Bill recognizes Breithaupt in that it
specifically provides that any person incapable of refusing to submit to
a test (by reason of being dead, unconscious, etc.) is not deemed as
having withdrawn consent to testing. This is the so-called "Vampire
Amendment" (Section 8). However, conscious refusal to submit to a
test is authorized under the House version, with the same punishment
for such refusal as provided in the Senate draft. It is to be hoped that
whatever eventually emerges as law will be more in line with the House
Bill. However, amendments are still being urged on the legislature
which will further undermine the effectiveness of this law. See Tulsa
Daily World, Feb. 18, 1967, pg. 16, col. 3.
It should be further noted here that California does not have a statute
similar to the above which the Supreme Court could have considered in
deciding Breithaupt and Schmerber.
'Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964); held: the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against self-incrimination operates through the Fourteenth
Amendment as against state infringement; overruling Twining v. New
Jersey, supra, note 16.
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tional right. Justice Brennan reviewed several previous cases in
reinforcing the Court's holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects an accused from
providing the state with evidence of a "testimonial" or "communicative" nature and that although petitioner Schmerber had been
compelled to submit to an attempt to uncover evidence to be used
in a prosecution against him, that " . . . Not even a shadow of
testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the
accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical
analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated ....
,,2 The Court pointed out that it had long been
held that the Fifth Amendment does not exclude the body of an
accused as evidence where fingerprints, photographs, physical
examinations, voice identification, etc., of the accused or pointing
out the accused to witnesses are involved? The Court then found
that Slood tests are analogous to such lawful uses of the body and
are therefore not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
In dealing with the unreasonable search and seizure claim, the
Court, as with the self-incrimination allegation, was forced to face
the constitutional issue which it had been able to avoid in Breithavpt. This was due to another post-Breithaupt decision, Mapp v.
note 1; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) which held
that it was not a prohibition of the Fifth Amendment to introduce evidence that accused had put on some clothing which linked him with the
crime and that it fit him, whether or not he did this voluntarily; Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which held that the Fifth
Amendment does forbid compulsory production of a man's private
papers to be used in evidence against him; Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), which held that the Fifth Amendment protects
one from being forced to disclose, on examination, the circumstances of
the alleged offense or sources from which evidence of its commission
may be obtained.
'$pra,
6, at 1832.
0 Holt v.note
United States, supra, note 28, at 252, 253.
"See 16 ALR 370 (1922), 63 AIR 1324 (1929) and 29 AR2d 1115
(1953) as to fingerprints; 3 AIR 1706 (1919) and 28 ALR2d 1115
(1953) as to palmprints; 35 AIR2d 856 (1954) as to footprints;
16 AIRd (1929) and 70 AIR2d 995 (1960) as to voice identification; 164 AIR 967 (1945), 25 ALR2d 1407 (1952) as to physical
examinations; 72 ALR2d 1322 (1960) as to pointing out accused to
witnesses.
'Supra,

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1967

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 4 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 7

19671

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Ohio.' Conceding that the compulsory blood test was a search
within the constitutional meaning, the Court had to determine
whether or not it was an unreasonable search. It held that as it
had already decided (in the same case) that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not forbid "
compelled intrusions into the body for blood . . .

,"

that the

proper function of the Fourth Amendment was to confine such
intrusions to those which are justified in the circumstances in each
case. In applying this test, the Court found that there was sufficient
cause, as shown by the record of the trial court, for the state
officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving while
intoxcated. The Court reviewed several prior cases involving the
purpose of a lawful searchu and the necessity of procurring a
search warrant prior to such search.' The Court then held that
since there was the danger of the destruction of the evidence 6
(the probability that the accused would become sober) during the
delay required to obtain a warrant which would allow the blood
test, that under these circumstances, the state action was "... an
12367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolfe v. Colorado, supra, note 15,
and applying the Fourth Amendment privilege to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures through the vehicle of the Fourteenth Amendment against state denial.
uSupra, note 6, at 1834.
'People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (Ct App. 1923) which

held that an officer may search an accused after a lawful arrest to dis-

cover evidence of the crime and that such search is not restricted to
things subject to be taken on search warrant without arrest; Weeks v.
United States, supra, note 17, which held that letters and private documents of an accused can be seized and used in evidence against him and
this is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) which reversed a federal
district court conviction (162 F.2d 562 [1947] ) based on evidence
obtained without a warrant, holding that the question of when the right

to privacy must yield to the right of search must be decided by a ju-

dicial, not a police officer; Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (T964)
which set out requisites for affidavits given by police officers in seeking a search warrant.
"Preston v. United States, 336 U.S. 364 (1964) which held that "...The
rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example,... by
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime ...
at

page 367.
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appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest."' The Court bolstered
its holding that the search in question was not unreasonable by reiterating the Breithauptfindings, that the taking of a blood sample
is virtually painless, involves no risk, and does not injure one's
health when performed by a physician in a hospital environment.
Justices Douglas and Fortas and Chief Justice Warren dissented in three short opinions based on the Warren and Douglas
dissents in Breithaupt." Those Breithaupt dissents urged the following of Rochin and attacked the majority's reliance on the
overriding need to enforce state traffic laws by the use of scientific
methods at the expense of Fourth and Fifth Amendment freedoms, by pointing out that this rule was not applied in Rochin
which involved an offense much more heinous (narcotics) than
the enforcement of traffic laws. The Breithaupt dissents noted
further that the sanctity of the person is equally violated where
the accused is incapable of resisting (as in Breithaupt) as it would
be if force were used to overcome his resistance (as in Rochin).
"We should, in my opinion, hold that due process means at least
that the law enforcement officers... must stop short of bruising
the body, breaking the skin, puncturing tissue or extracting body
fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by force or by stealth."'
In his Schmerber dissent Justice Douglas also brought in the idea
of invasion 0of the right of privacy as discussed in Griswold v,
Connecticut
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, also dissented by
separate opinion attacking the Court's narrow construction of the
Fifth Amendment. Black severely criticized the use of the restrictive words "testimonial" and "communicative" and then argued
that the actions of the state required petitioner to provide evidence
which was both testimonial and communicative in character and
therefore forbidden by the Fifth Amendment guarantee that an
accused not be compelled to be a witness against himself. ..... it
seems to me that the compulsory extraction . . . of blood for

analysis so that the person who analyzed it could give evidence to
I'Supra, note 6, at 1836.
'Supra, note 12, at 440, 442.
"Supra, note 12, at 443.

"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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convict him had both a 'testimonial' and a 'communicative' na-

ture. '4' "In such a situation, blood, of course, is not oral testi-

mony given by an accused, but it can certainly 'communicate' to a
court and jury the fact of guilt."'2 Justice Black also relies on his
concurring opinion in Rochin and on the Breithaupt dissents.
In summary, it can only be said that the Court, when confronted with Schmerber, was faced with the alternative choices of
following Rochin or Breithaupt. Conceivably, the Court could
have found the fact situation more analagous to Rochin, without
overruling Breithaupt. Schmerber and Rochin differed only in
that physical force was employed by the State in the latter where
only oral resistance and objection was met by the State in the
former. Schmerber and Breithaupt differed only in the state of
consciousness of the accused and the resulting lack of refusal to
submit to the test in the latter case. If Schmerber had physically
resisted to the point that he had to be forcibly restrained and the
sample taken, it is likely that at least one of the majority of
justices would have joined the Schmerber and Breithauptdissenters
in applying the Rochin "sense of justice" rule thus producing an
opposite result.
Our Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has also become
involved in this area of constitutional law. In the 1956 case of
Alexander v. State,' the defendant was convicted in a Tulsa Municipal Court for the crime of driving while intoxicated. Immediately after her arrest, defendant was told to perform some
manual acts such as the standard "walking the straight line" and
to blow into a balloon from which a sample of her breath was
obtained. The results of an analysis of this sample (the Harger
Drunkometer Test) showing intoxication was admitted over objection at the trial. Defendant testified that she had not been
advised as to her right to remain silent and her right to counsel
and thought at the time she performed these acts that she was
required to do so. The State did not refute this testimony.
On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the
evidence of the manual and breath tests were, in effect, obtained
41Supra, note 6, at 1837.
'Supra, note 6, at 1838.
'Alexander v. State, 305 P.2d 572 (OkUl Crim. App. 1956).
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by compulsion. The court was, therefore, faced for the first time
with deciding whether or not this was a violation of defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination under both the federal and
Oklahoma constitutions." In a rather extensive survey of prior
Oklahoma case law involving this fundamental freedom together
with a review of decisions from sister states, particularly Texas
cases, the court in affirming the conviction found " ...

there is

no substantial difference between obtaining a specimen of blood
or breath of an accused, under ordinary circumstances, and obtaining fingerprints or physical property, the process of which is
a pertinent issue in the charge against him.

.

."' and that, there-

fore, the privilege against self-incrimination was not involved by
admission of testimony as to the results of the drunkometer test
taken without defendant's permission. This was virtually the same
reasoning the United States Supreme Court applied in deciding
Schmerber. Our court also quoted from and discussed Rochin at
length, being able to easily distinguish the two cases. The court
also made a very broad policy pronouncement in stating " ... We

do not believe that a fettish should be made of Art. II, Sec. 21 of
the Oklahoma Constitution, the self-incrimination provision, to
protect enemies of society, and the drunken driver seems to be
exactly that. ..."' It will be noted that this argument was also

brought out by the United States Supreme Court in the Breithaupt
decision.
In the later case of Cox v.State7 defendant was involved in
an automobile accident and was injured. At a Norman, Oklahoma
hospital, he consented to both breath and blood tests, the results
of which indicated intoxication. Defendant was charged with first
degree manslaughter, and at his trial moved to suppress the evidence of results of these tests on the grounds that he had been
suffering from a concussion at the time and was, therefore, unable
to give his consent. The trial court received evidence on the Motion to Suppress and denied same. The Court of Criminal Appeals
on review began by stating that the results of such tests taken
"U. S. CoNsT. amend.

V;

OKLA.CONST. art II, sec. 21.

I'Supra,note 43, at 584.
"Sapra, note 43, at 585.
o Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964).
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involuntarily are inadmissible as a violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The court then went on to affirm
the conviction holding that the burden was on defendant to show
on the Motion to Suppress that he was unable, because of his
injury, to give his consent, and that he had not met this burden.
The court did not so much as mention the Alexander case, but
it appears that if defendant had been able to show in Cox that
he had not consented to the tests, that Alexander would have been
overruled. Had the court in Cox begun by finding that defendant
had not shown on the Motion to Suppress that there was any
lack of consent it would have been unnecessary to decide whether
or not it would have been unconstitutional to admit into evidence
the results of the tests if there had been no consent. By first stating that such evidence would be inadmissible and then finding
that one of the elements of such inadmissibility ("involuntariness") was lacking, the court's declaration as to inadmissibility
would appear to be dicta.
However, the Cox case was cited later with approval in Lorenz
v. State,' the fact situation of which was almost identical as that
in Breithaapt as discussed previously. However, the result in
Lorenz was opposite the result in Breithaupt.Our Court in Lorenz
held that to admit testimony as to the results of a blood test in
the trial of an accused for the crime of driving while intoxicated,
when the blood sample was taken when the accused was unconscious, was involuntary and a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. Our court in reversing the conviction of Mr.
Lorenz took the Cox holding as to inadmissibility of evidence of
blood and breath tests involuntarily taken out of the realm of
dicta and made it for all practical purposes the law of Oklahoma.
It will be noted that both Cox and Lorenz were decided after
Breithaupt came down from the United States Supreme Court and
are contra thereto. Whether Oklahoma courts will in the future
follow the Breithaupt-Schmerberrule or if they will continue to
adhere to the Oklahoma Cox-Lorenz rule is a matter of conjecture.
However, it is almost certain that if any such cases are reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court, a reversal of Cox and Lorenz
will result.
W. Jay Jones
"Lorenz v. State, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965.)
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